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ANOTHER LOOK AT THAT FORBIDDEN WORD
INSURANCE

-

In a personal injury or death action, the courts have habitually
sought to conceal the fact that a defendant or plaintiff is insured
against liability or loss on account of negligence. At its inception the
social impact of the rule was negligible. This is no longer true. Today
there are an estimated sixty-two million motor vehicles in operation
in the United States and an estimated seventy-five million licensed
drivers. Since collisions are to some extent inevitable in a wheeled
society propelled by gasoline and alcohol, motor vehicle accidents now
constitute a major source of negligence suits burdening our courts.
Recognizing the social consequences of mass execution by automobile,
all states' have enacted laws designed to provide financially responsible
defendants, so that personal injuries and property damage resulting
from motor vehicle accidents will not go uncompensated. Spurred by
these state laws and perhaps by a sensible desire to protect their pocketbooks, most automobile owners now carry some type of motor vehicle
liability insurance.
In negligence actions involving motor vehicle accidents, the plaintiff's lawyer's fee is generally a contingent one geared to a percentage
of the hoped-for judgment. The plaintiff's lawyer, therefore, is most
eager to increase the amount recovered; perhaps it is the pressure that
results from this system that aggravates the problems involved in improper insurance disclosure.
The most direct method of disclosing the fact of insurance is to
join the insurer as a defendant. In the absence of statute, such joinder
is not permitted. 2 This means that if any disclosure is to be made, it
will have to be indirectly, for, as a general rule, the lawyer cannot
openly inform the jury via evidence or argument of a party's insurance;
according to evidentiary logic, insurance is irrelevant to the determination of fault, and a disclosure may prejudice the jury against the defendant on the questions of both fault and damages.3

'E.g.,

FLA. STAT. c. 324 (1955); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§9.2201-.2232 (1952); PA. STAT.
tit. 75, §§1277.1-81.3 (1953).
See Note, 1953 Wis. L. REv. 688, for a general discussion of joinder of insurance
companies as party defendants.
3See, e.g., Colquett v. Williams, 264 Ala. 214, 86 So.2d 381 (1956); Consolidated
Motors, Inc. v. Ketcham, 49 Ariz. 295, 66 P.2d 246 (1937); Lavigne v. Ballantyne, 66
R.I. 123, 17 A.2d 845 (1941).
ANN.
2
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NOTES
LEGITIMATE REFERENCES

Issues at Trial
Though the fact of insurance is inadmissible as bearing on the issues
of fault or damages, it may be admissible as bearing on some other
issue of the case, under the so-called multiple admissibility rule. 4
Theoretically the lawyer introducing the fact of insurance must convince the trial judge that his only purpose is to. throw light on the
particular issue to which it is directed, and not to covertly prejudice
the jury against the defendant on the issues of fault and damages. As
a practical matter, whether the mention of insurance is allowed depends more upon the skill of the lawyer in mustering conceptual
justifications for the introduction of such evidence than upon the
ability of the court to divine his actual purpose.
Vicarious liability. A well-recognized application of the multiple
admissibility rule is the admission of the fact of insurance to establish
legal relationships giving rise to vicarious liability. The existence of
liability insurance on a particular automobile has been used to show
the defendant's consciousness of responsibility for the acts of the
driver, whom the plaintiff sought to establish as an agent. 5 Similarly,
this type of evidence was admitted to prove a master-servant relationship6 and to prove the ownership or control of the instrumentality that
was the subject of the insurance."
Impeachment of Witnesses. The fact of insurance may be introduced to discredit an adverse witness by demonstrating his bias, prejudice, or interest." If the witness is an employee of the insurer - an
investigator or an adjuster - the party offering him must be prepared
to have his relationship to the insurer disclosed; since the party offers
the witness to be believed, he should not have the right to close the
door to exploration of facts bearing on the witness' credibility. 9
'See 2 Womom, EvmExcE §282a (3d ed. 1940); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761 (1949).
5See Moore-Handley Hdwe. Co. v. Williams, 238 Ala. 189, 189 So. 757 (1939);
Leonard v. Kreider, 51 Ohio App. 474, 1 N.E.2d 956 (1935); Biggins v. Wagner, 60
S.D. 581, 245 N.V. 385 (1932).
eRashall v. Morra, 250 App. Div. 474, 294 N.Y. Supp. 630 (2d Dep't 1937).
7Pagano v. Leisner, 5 Ill. App.2d 223, 125 N.E.2d 301 (1955) (automobile);
Perkins v. Rice, 187 Mass. 28, 72 N.E. 323 (1904) (elevator).
82 WIGMOR-E, EViDENCE §282a (3d ed. 1940).

9Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 227 N.C. 412, 42 S.E.2d 593 (1947); Butcher

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1957

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1957], Art. 5
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
Some enterprising lawyers have carried the rule a step further and
raised the spectre of insurance in rehabilitating their witnesses who
had been discredited on cross-examination.-' For example, in a Florida
case defendant's counsel attacked the credibility of the plaintiff by use
of a written statement obtained shortly after an accident in which
the plaintiff was seriously injured. On redirect plaintiff's counsel was
permitted to show that the statement was obtained by an agent of
the defendant's insurer while plaintiff was in the hospital."
Voir Dire Examination
The fact of insurance may be disclosed even before the trial; the
plaintiff's right to an impartial jury undoubtedly extends to finding
out on voir dire examination whether a prospective juror has some
insurance company connection that would tend to make him prejudiced against the plaintiff. 12 If the venireman is in fact interested in
1 3
if his
the defendant's insurer, he may be challenged for cause;

interest is only in a similar insurance company, the plaintiff probably
will not have ground for a challenge for cause, but he may desire to
14
challenge peremptorily.
Obviously, an unrestricted inquiry by the plaintiff on voir dire
into the insurance connections of the veniremen would disclose, either
directly or by notorious inference, that the defendant is insured. Therefore, the courts, seeking to balance the conflicting rights of the parties,
have limited this inquiry so as to protect the defendant from great
prejudice while affording the plaintiff access to sufficient information
upon which to base his challenges effectively. Although the restrictions on a plaintiff's mode of inquiry differ from state to state, most
jurisdictions allow the plaintiff to make the inquiry if it is characterized
15
by "good faith."'
v. Stull, 82 S.E.2d 278 (W. Va. 1954); cf. Majestic v. Louisville & N.R.R., 147 F.2d 621
(6th Cir. 1945).

Williams v. Matlin, 328 111. App. 645, 66 N.E.2d 719 (1946); Young i.
0oSee
Sonking, 275 App. Div. 871, 88 N.Y.S.2d 392 (3d Dep't 1949); Schuetzle v. NashFinch Co., 72 S.D. 588, 38 N.W.2d 137 (1949).
lSee Turner v. Modern Beauty Supply Co., 152 Fla. 3, 10 So.2d 488 (1942)
(semble).
' 2 See cases collected in Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761, 793 (1949).
'SSee Murphy v. Cole, 338 Mo. 13, 88 S.W.2d 1023, 103 A.L.R. 505 (1935).
14See Shams v. Saportas, 152 Fla. 48, 52, 10 So.2d 715, 717 (1942) (dictum);
Fedorinchik v. Stewart, 289 Mich. 436, 439, 286 N.W. 673, 674 (1939) (dictum).
13See e.g., Lambert v. Higgins, 63 So.2d 631 (Fla. 1953); Helton v. Prater's Adm'r,
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NOTES
The precise meaning of "good faith" remains vague. There has
been a definite tendency on the part of some states, however, to specify
certain steps for the plaintiff to follow in establishing his good faith.1 6
He may be required to show that he has reasonable grounds to believe
that the defendant is actually insured; this may be done by an affidavit
or an oral statement made to the court out of the presence of the
venire. In some jurisdictions the lawyer must then proceed with his
questioning through definite stages, beginning with very general questions about their business or corporate connections, and proceeding to
questions about connections with insurance companies generally, and
finally to pointed questions about specific insurers. If the plaintiff follows the appropriate procedure in his state, the defendant generally
cannot get a reversal on the basis that he was prejudiced by the interrogation. But if the plaintiff deviates from the charted course, a
new trial may be granted unless the error is cured, or deemed harm17
less.
Some courts still regard disclosure of defendant's insurance on
voir dire examination as a very prejudicial matter. The extreme example of this attitude is the Illinois court, which has ruled"' that the
plaintiff must demonstrate his good faith not only by privately revealing
the defendant's insurance to the court but also by presenting grounds
for a reasonable belief that the venire contains prospective jurors who
have disqualifying interests. A plaintiff's affidavit to the effect that the
defendant's insurance company had a large office and many employees
in the area was held 9 insufficient to support such a belief in the face
of the defendant's affidavit that no prospective juror was a stockholder, employee, officer, broker, or agent of the particular insurer involved. Thus in Illinois the defendant can by this stratagem foreclose
questioning the venire about connections with other insurers.
A less drastic procedure than that of Illinois is found in the
Arizona practice. 20 This procedure requires that the inquirer first
determine whether any juror is connected with large corporations or
businesses; if there are affirmative answers, the prospective juror may
272 Ky. 574, 114 S.W.2d 1120 (1938); Leishman v. Taylor, 199 Ore. 546, 263 P.2d

605 (1953).
16See Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 761, 802 (1949).
-7Avery v. Collins, 171 Miss. 636, 157 So. 695 (1934); cf. Blanton v. Butler, 81
So.2d 745 (Fla. 1955).
18Wheeler v. Rudek, 397 Ill. 438, 74 N.E.2d 601 (1947).
lObid.
2ODunipace v. Martin, 73 Ariz. 415, 242 P.2d 543 (1952).
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then be asked to disclose the type of corporations or businesses involved and his relationship to them. Thus, insurance will not be mentioned unless a venireman has an interest in some insurance company.
Nevertheless, the plaintiff's right of inquiry extends to possible connections with similar insurers as well as the particular insurer involved.
It has been suggested that the possibility of a prospective juror's
being prejudiced in favor of a defendant because of his interest in an
uninvolved insurance company is remote. The argument is that without an inquiry inferring insurance the juror would not know that the
defendant is insured; and if by the usual questions it is determined
that the juror is unacquainted with the defendant and his attorney
he would not suppose that his particular insurance company is defending the suit even if he suspects that the defendant is insured. The
ground for fearing prejudice is that his company, not just any company, is going to pay the verdict. If the inquiry is allowed, however,
the possibility that the venire will infer that the defendant is insured
is very high. In answer to this argument, plaintiffs' attorneys suggest
that because jurors interested in insurance companies may be "defense-minded" the need to eliminate such jurors is nonetheless real.
The Florida Supreme Court has specifically rejected the use of the
Illinois affidavit technique and has held 2' that the plaintiff's right of
inquiry into the insurance connections of prospective jurors extends
to those connections with companies similar to that insuring the defendant. In Ryan v. Noble2 2 the Florida Court indicated its preference
for a procedure approximating that espoused by the Arizona court.
There is a significant difference, however: having ascertained that the
venireman has a business interest, in Florida the plaintiff may then
broach the subject of insurance by asking whether the business is an
insurance corporation. A number of Florida lawyers have indicated
that the voir dire examination is the most convenient time for bringing
23
the defendant's insurance to the jury's attention.
All of the Florida practitioners interviewed concurred in the view
that once the plaintiff asks a question concerning insurance connections,
the prospective jurors understand that the defendant has insurance.
21Shams v. Saportas, 152 Fla. 48, 10 So.2d 715 (1942).
2295 Fla. 830, 840, 116 So. 766, 769 (1928) (dictum).
231n response to this practice, one defense attorney suggested filing a counterclaim and then laying the predicate to enable an interrogation of the veniremen
concerning insurance, thus attempting to nullify the effect of the plaintiff's questioning in this regard.
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This would not be an unreasonable assumption by the jury even in
the absence of questioning, for jurors are likely to assume insurance
coverage in most motor vehicle accident cases, even though a financial
responsibility law such as Florida's24 is not compulsory. Realizing this,
some courts have come to regard the attempt to conceal insurance from
the jury as a futile gesture. This attitude has prompted a lenient view
of transgressions of the inadmissibility rule; in some jurisdictions the
procedure itself seems to place few limitations on the interrogation of
25
the veniremen.
IMPROPER REFERENCES

Improper injection of the fact that the defendant is insured ordinarily will constitute prejudicial error, warranting a mistrial, new trial,
or reversal on appeal. There are situations, however, in which insurance may be improperly disclosed to the jury and yet be deemed
harmless. A defendant who injects the matter himself28 or who fails
to make timely and appropriate objection27 to the plaintiff's disclosure of the fact cannot thereafter be heard to complain. Even if
the plaintiff injects the matter and the defendant properly objects,
the trial court, by exclusion of the objectionable matter and an immediate instruction to the jury to disregard it, may succeed in curing the
2 8

error.

Whether improper injection of insurance will be deemed reversible
error differs from state to state and from case to case, depending on a
myriad of variables. The size of the verdict,29 the apparent good or
bad faith of the references by witness or counsel, and the cumulative
effect of improper references- have all received emphasis in the decisions.
24FLA. STAT. c. 324 (1955).

25See Dedmon v. Thalheimer, 290 S.W.2d 16 (Ark. 1956); Rains v. Rains, 97
Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935).
26See Fogelsong v. Jarman, 168 Ore. 177, 121 P.2d 924 (1942); Reid v. Owens, 98
Utah 50, 59, 93 P.2d 680, 684 (dictum).
27Ryan v. Noble, 95 Fla. 830, 116 So. 766 (1928); Hatfield v. Levy Bros., 18 Cal.2d
798, 813, 117 P.2d 841, 848 (1941) (dictum); Johns v. Shinall, 103 Colo. 381, 390,
86 P.2d 605, 609 (1939) (dictum).
2See Hiller v. Goodwin, 258 Ala. 700, 65 So.2d 152 (1953); Wall v. Little, 102
Fla. 1015, 136 So. 676 (1931).
29lndamer Corp. v. Crandon, 217 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1954); Morton v. Holaday,
121 Fla. 813, 164 So. 514 (1935).
3OCarl's Markets, Inc. v. Meyer, 69 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1953); Boyne v. Schulte, 222
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instruction to Disregard
To evaluate the success of this method of saving a trial, attention
can be profitably turned to some of the results of the University of
Chicago Law School Jury Project,31 which studied, among other things,
the effect of the mention of insurance on jury verdicts. Using recordings
of an ordinary negligence case, three degrees of insurance emphasis
were introduced into the same basic case. These cases were then played
to a total of thirty different lay juries. In the first version of the case,
the defendant disclosed on cross-examination that he had no insurance.
The mean jury award was $33,000. In the second version of the case,
the defendant, at the same point in the trial, disclosed that he had insurance, but no objection was made and no further mention of insurance occurred. The mean award for this version of the case was $37,000.
In the third version, the defendant again disclosed on cross-examination
that he had insurance, but the disclosure was objected to by the defendant's counsel and the trial court explicitly instructed the jury to
disregard the statement. The mean jury award rose to $46,000!
The same three versions of the case were submitted to a group of
trial and appellate judges. As might be expected, the judges gave their
lowest awards in the instance in which there was the instruction to
disregard the insurance. In the other two situations the familiar pattern re-occurred. When the defendant revealed that he had no insurance, the mean award was $32,500; a mean award of $40,300 was
granted when the defendant disclosed that he had insurance but no
further notice was taken of it.
Assuming these figures to be an accurate reflection of the reaction to
insurance, they document the common suspicion that juries react
more prejudicially to the defendant as insurance receives greater emphasis, whether that emphasis comes by instruction to disregard or
otherwise. Conversely, insurance is least prejudicial when everyone is
silent on the point. While the size of the sampling and the methods
employed in the Chicago Jury Project cannot be said to have developed
unimpeachable data for determination of this issue, it can be said that
the results conform to the observations of many practitioners and
S.W.2d 503 (Mo. 1949).
3'All facts concerning the jury project were taken from a mimeographed text
of a speech, entitled "Report on the Jury Project of the University of Chicago Law
School," delivered at a conference on legal research at the University of Michigan
Law School on Nov. 5, 1955, by Prof. Harry Kalven, Jr., of the University of Chicago
Law School.
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judges of long experience. The curative effect of an instruction to disregard, then, may be seriously doubted, for apparently it serves only to
further prejudice the defendant's insurance company and, if the defendant be only partially insured, the defendant as well.
CONCLUSION

It is hardly controvertible that the plaintiff's lawyer often wishes
to expose the defendant's insurer so that the jury will be able to identify
the pocket from which an eventual judgment will be paid. It is precisely this inclination that the inadmissibility rule seeks to frustrate.
The rule as presently applied by the courts does little more than
increase the already burdensome appellate work-load and add another
argumentative factor at the trial level; it clearly does not effectuate the
underlying policy. Assuming the desirability of this policy, strict
enforcement of the rule is needed. A reference to insurance should
not be deemed legitimate if there is other evidence of a nonprejudicial
nature sufficient to establish the point in issue; the Illinois procedure,
or at least the Arizona procedure, should be adopted for voir dire
examinations. The prejudicial effect of an improper reference by a
plaintiff's witness should not be left to the questionable cure of an
instruction to disregard, but should be automatic grounds for mistrial.
The present trend of decisions evinces a disposition on the part
of the courts to be more concerned with adequately compensating the
injured plaintiff than with the prejudicial effect of a disclosure of insurance on the insurer's pocketbook. This adumbrated shift in policy
has rendered the inadmissibility rule archaic and the courts' verbal
homage unrealistic. In view of this, alternatives that entirely banish
the rule have some appeal. Three proposed alternatives will be considered briefly. They are devised for other purposes as well, but they
may effectively supplant the need for the inadmissibility rule.
Direct Action Statutes. In at least two states 32 plaintiffs in motor
vehicle accident cases may proceed directly against the wrong-doer's
insurer, whose defenses against the insured are saved. Obviously, verdicts are somewhat higher when a direct remedy is available; consequently, insurance rates tend to become higher as well. But the ensuing decrease in the rather excessive and fruitless litigation over
32LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §22"655 (1951);

Vis. STAT. §260.11 (1955).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1957

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1957], Art. 5
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

purported infractions of the inadmissibility rule may be worth the
price.
Compulsoiy Liability Insurance. Some states that have compulsory
liability insurance laws applicable to a particular class, such as common
33
carriers, have ruled that disclosure of the insurer's interest is not error.
If the compulsory features of these statutes were extended to the now
existing general financial responsibility laws, the inadmissibility rule
would cease to function; a juror should be presumed to know the laws
of his own state, and merely refreshing his memory would be harmless.
An increase in insurance rates might result, but not necessarily so, for
the compulsory feature of the law would provide a wider base for distribution of the risk.
Administrative Handling of Claims. Another suggestion is that
automobile accident litigation should be disposed of administratively,
in a manner somewhat like the present workman's compensation procedure34 Whether the concept of fault should be displaced by strict
liability as has been done in one jurisdiction- is an important policy
question. Some such system could conceivably be the eventual solution;
practically the same motivating factors which led to the adoption of
the workman's compensation plan - prolonged and expensive litigation, excessive verdicts, forced settlements, the general uncertainty,
the increasing number of accidents - are now operating in favor of
creation of a similar system for settlement of automobile claims.
The reader's reaction to this suggestion should emphasize to him
that most attitudes concerning the alternatives to or justifications for
the inadmissibility rule are determined by policy attitudes toward the
present or potential role of insurance in society, rather than by technical legal attitudes toward the administration of rules of evidence and
procedure in the courtroom.
RiCHARD

A.

PErTIGREW

33See, e.g., Yellow Cab Co. v. Bradin, 172 Md. 388, 191 At. 717 (1937); Shadwick v.
Hills, 79 Ohio App. 143, 69 N.E.2d 197 (1946); Scott v. Wells, 214 S.C. 511, 515, 53
S.E.2d 400, 401 (1949) (dictum).
34See Green, The Automobile Accident Insurance Act of Saskatchewan, 2
CHiTY'S L.J. 38 (1952).
351d. at 39: "[The] Act imposed upon the motoring class an absolute liability
to collectively pay limited compensation to persons suffering from bodily injury or
death as the result of the operation of a motor vehicle, irrespective of fault .... "
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